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the purpose of the present paper is to suggest ways in which historians may 
use behavior analysis as a tool to design research agendas that may help 
them understand complex human behavior and atypical decision making pro-
cesses. this paper presents a brief outline describing the general epistemo-
logical and pragmatic virtues of approaching human behavior from a behavior 
analytic perspective. this outline is followed by a general description of the 
elements that should be taken into consideration when developing a research 
agenda based on behavior analytic principles. lastly a research agenda re-
garding a series of puzzling events leading to the encirclement of German 
sixth army during the so called “Battle of stalingrad,” is used to exemplify the 
methodology proposed in this paper.
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reSuMen
el propósito de este ensayo es el de sugerir formas en que los historiado-
res pueden utilizar los principios del análisis de la conducta para desarrollar 
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agendas de investigación que les ayuden a comprender el comportamiento 
humano complejo y los procesos de toma de decisiones atípicos. el ensa-
yo comienza con una breve presentación de las virtudes epistemológicas y 
pragmáticas de aproximarse a la conducta humana desde la perspectiva del 
análisis de la conducta. después de presentar las principales características 
del análisis de la conducta se describen los elementos que deben ser toma-
dos en consideración al elaborar una agenda de investigación desde esta 
perspectiva. Por último, y para ejemplificar la aproximación, se presenta una 
agenda de investigación relacionada con una serie de extraños eventos que 
desembocaron en el aniquilamiento del sexto ejército alemán durante la lla-
mada “Batalla de stalingrado.”
Palabras clave: Batalla de stalingrado, análisis de la conducta, agenda 
de investigación
history may be conceptualized as the analysis of testimonies regarding the 
behavior of the human species. Given its interest in human behavior, the beha-
vior sciences are valuable tools for historians, however when historians have 
relied on psychology to help them understand particular sets of events, they 
have turned towards theories that lack empirical support (see Binion, 1982 
for a review). It is easy to understand why more scientific approaches within 
the behavioral sciences have failed to establish contact with many historians. 
Behavior analysts for instance are rigorously trained to avoid unsupported 
generalizations of their data (Risely, 2001). although this kind of training has 
helped to create a rigorous, respectable and useful scientific discipline it has 
automatically alienated it from the “quantum leap” involved in developing a 
carefully planed experiment and suggesting that the observed behavior is 
identical to that presented three centuries ago by some english sovereign 
(see for instance de Mause, 2002 for multiple examples of this kind of unsu-
pported generalizations).
The present paper was not written to try to undermine the sound scientific 
training of future behavior analysts; additionally this paper does not intend to 
question the careful principles regarding experimentation and theory develo-
pment that have made behavior analysis a respectable scientific discipline. 
Instead, this paper endeavors to explore ways in which solid scientific findings 
regarding human behavior may be offered to historians as a useful tool for 
designing fruitful research agendas. 
one way to develop the ideas presented on the previous paragraphs 
would be to organize this paper in three different segments. first of all, the 
reader should attain a clear concept of the differences that separate traditio-
nal, mentalist psychology from behavior analysis; in a similar vein the first 
portion of this paper should give the reader the opportunity to assess the 
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scientific and pragmatic virtues of behavior analysis as a tool for understan-
ding human behavior. the second portion of this paper will present a brief 
outline on the facts regarding the encirclement of the German sixth army 
during 1942 by soviet army groups (the so called “Battle of stalingrad”). the 
second segment of this paper will also focus on the behavior of the German 
high command during the months preceding the battle. lastly, the events 
regarding the battle will be analyzed from a behavior-analytic perspective ai-
ming at the development of a new research agenda that may be offered to 
historians interested in the subject. 
on Behavior analySiS
Behavior analysis may be conceptualized as a natural science that endea-
vors to understand and predict behavior through the systematic analysis of 
its relations with the environment. as such behavior analysis is in general 
disagreement with the idea that sustains that the determinants of behavior are 
metaphysical in nature and “exist” in the form of immaterial thoughts inside 
the subjects head (skinner, 1953). as an objective science, behavior analysts 
reject the idea that valuable data regarding human behavior may be obtai-
ned through introspective methodologies. data regarding the relationships 
between behavior and the environment should only be obtained through the 
direct observation of these phenomena (skinner, 1990). 
Behavior analysis was originally designed by Bf skinner in 1938. using 
carefully designed experiments and automated equipment, skinner found that 
the behavior of organisms is fundamentally determined by its consequences. 
Further research by his students showed this finding to be general across a 
number of animal species (see for instance ferster, 1958). Research focused 
in the applications of Skinner’s findings showed human behavior was highly 
sensitive to change in reinforcement contingencies (Bijou, 1955; Wolf & Ris-
ley , 1965). an impressive number of subsequent replications gave conside-
rable empirical support to skinner’s idea that behavior is determined by its 
consequences.
as it may be inferred from the previous paragraph, behavior analysis differs 
from traditional psychology in a number of interesting ways. first of all its me-
thodology and its focus on behavior as a legitimate study object makes it possi-
ble to characterize it as a science. furthermore the basic explanatory principles 
derived by this science have been obtained through careful and painstaking 
experimental research; finally, behavior analysis has established the founda-
tions for an impressive number of different technological developments that are 
currently used (amongst others) in clinical, educational, social and pharmacolo-
gical settings (see Bellack, hersen and Kazdin, 1982 for a review).
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if behavior analysis is such a powerful tool for understanding human be-
havior, can it help historians understand the past? in the following section a 
well known but puzzling sequence of events regarding the German invasion 
of soviet Russia in 1941 will be presented to the reader. after the description 
of these facts, an attempt to develop a research agenda based on a behavior 
analytic perspective will be presented to the reader.
on The BaTTle of STalingrad
operation Blue was generally designed by hitler with the purpose of depriving 
stalin from the rich oil and grain deposits located in ukraine. it was composed 
of a series of armored thrusts and pincer movements spearheaded by frie-
drich paulus’s sixth army. in its opening stages, (June and July) operation 
Blue was highly successful as enormous numbers of Russian soldiers and 
material were captured by the panzer divisions, however towards the end 
of october the general momentum of the offensive had stalled and the sixth 
Army was detained in costly street fighting in the industrial city of Stalingrad. 
the “wings” of sixth army were sparsely covered by poorly equipped Ruma-
nian and italian forces and the risk of encirclement and eventual annihila-
tion of all German troops inside the city appeared imminent. time and again 
hitler’s generals pointed out this peril to him and advised him to move out of 
the city (von Manstein, 1958).
during the early hours of november 19th 1942 stalin unleashed opera-
tion uranus on the front protected by the Rumanian third army, strong armo-
red pincers quickly dissolved any resistance trapping nearly 300 000 soldiers 
in the stalingrad pocket. hitler was urged by his generals to allow paulus to 
fight his way out of the pocket, instead he ordered Sixth Army to “stand fast” 
and wait for general hoth to open a passage to the pocket (carell, 1966). 
the decision was disastrous; despite repeated assurances by Goering that 
he could keep Sixth Army provisioned by the Luftwaffe the tonnage flown into 
the pocket was consistently insufficient to keep the army going (Bergstrom, 
2008). the soldiers slowly starved and ran out of ammunition; hoth`s offensi-
ve petered out as his panzer divisions had to be sent elsewhere to stem other 
soviet threats. eventually the entire sixth army died or passed into soviet 
captivity; fewer than six thousand eventually returned to their homeland. not 
even at the end of January, when only isolated German pockets of resistance 
remained did hitler abandon his “stand fast” order. only two soldiers mana-
ged to escape stalingrad and return to the German lines.
the stalingrad disaster was a terrible blow to hitler’s prestige as a war-
lord and also a turning point in the second World War. it is also however a 
strange event within military history because the “stand fast” order and hitler’s 
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disregard for his generals advice appeared completely counterproductive to 
the German war effort. as the events regarding the Battle of stalingrad were 
basically the result of a single individual’s decision process they also appear 
highly attractive for psychological speculation. the following section suggests 
how a research agenda on this subject may be designed from a behavior 
analytic perspective.
a reSearch agenda BaSed on a Behavior 
analyTic PerSPecTive
a research agenda based on a behavior analytic perspective, designed to 
clarify the events that led to the annihilation of sixth army, should be designed 
around two principal issues. In the first place the agenda should endeavor to 
describe hitler’s decision process with as much detail and clarity as possible. 
Once the target behavior is adequately defined historians should proceed to 
identify other occasions when the target behavior was emitted, followed by a 
careful analysis of the specific consequences produced by this behavior. 
the present author has already commenced research on the previously 
described agenda. this research has been principally based on commercially 
available texts on the subject and therefore should only be considered as a 
starting point for serious historians to consider (or reject). 
hitler’s generals generically referred to the series of events culminating 
with the encirclement of sixth army as the “stand fast order” (see for instance 
Gorlitz, 1989). this particular order was relatively infrequent during 1940 and 
comparatively more common by the end of the war (Guderian, 1952). in its 
basic form a general receiving this order could not, under any circumstance, 
withdraw from his present position and should issue his soldiers orders to dig 
in and “sell their lives dearly.” towards the end of the war the series of events 
that led hitler to issue this order were well known by his generals and have 
been described in very similar ways by different individuals. in general all des-
criptions suggest that any battle group separated from neighboring units (or 
completely encircled by enemy forces) could expect to receive this order as 
soon as news of the events reached hitler’s headquarters (Gorlitz, 1989).  
as has been mentioned previously this order was relatively infrequent at 
the beginning of the war. According to general Jodl’s letters this behavior first 
appeared in 1940 during the German invasion of norway. British destroyers 
patrolling the waters in the vicinity of narvick prevented German invasion for-
ces from receiving provisions. Jodl colorfully describes hitler’s “despair” and 
complete incapability of “deciding” what to do about the situation. his more 
experienced and formally educated advisors simply suggested the garrison 
be ordered to “dig in and wait.” in this particular context and war situation the 
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decision was clearly successful as the destroyers were promptly withdrawn 
to cover other war interests of the hardly pressed and overstretched British 
empire (particularly the withdrawal of english troops in dunkirk). 
the stand fast order was issued again during the terrible winter of 1941, 
with a stalled German offensive “shivering” before Moscow’s gates. strong 
masses of siberian troops on skis penetrated deep into the German rear-
guard creating havoc and producing dozens of requests for withdrawal from 
hitler’s generals (Guderian, 1952). this new crisis was quick to “elicit” the 
“stand fast” order from hitler and military history today regards this decision 
as the main reason why army group center was not destroyed during the 
winter of 1941 (see for instance carell, 1966). Many historians also claim that 
saving army group center in 1941 increased hitler’s military prestige enor-
mously; additionally it also confirmed Hitler in his ever increasing tendency to 
disregard good advice provided by his generals (and it has been suggested 
that it confirmed many of  his generals in their meek and servile obedience to 
the warlord’s wimps).
stand fast orders were again issued during february 1942 when six Ger-
man paratrooper divisions were encircled near demyansk. the German tro-
ops where eventually released from the demyansk pocket after months of 
successful air provisioning. 
viewed in the light of these preceding events the stalingrad disaster 
appears more inevitable than improbable. obviously professional historians 
interested on the subject could provide a sounder basis for an operant condi-
tioning account of the previously described events. additionally, professional 
historians could probably have access to more reliable testimonies than those 
consulted by the present author. also they could probably develop and test 
alternative explanatory models for the same set of events. in any case the 
present paper suggests research agendas for historians may be developed 
using a behavior analytic perspective; how far can this agendas take historical 
research exceeds the purpose of this paper.  
it is necessary to note here that both soldiers and writers have suggested 
(in layman’s terms) ideas similar to those expressed in this paper. Jodl (1976) 
for instance wondered if the narvick events were an important lesson that the 
“autodidact had learned by heart.” in a similar vein carrel (1966) wondered if 
the demyansk pocket situation was counterproductive in the long run for the 
German war effort (by confirming Hitler to hold in Stalingrad). This paper is in 
general agreement with the ideas expressed by both Jodl and carrel but also 
suggests that the Battle of stalingrad could be approached by historians as a 
dramatic example of the effects of positive reinforcement on human behavior. 
the battle of stalingrad may also be approached as an interesting example of 
the way in which an individual reinforcement story adventitiously shapes the 
fates of millions.
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an arguMenTaTive and MeThodological SynTheSiS
the collaboration between historians and the behavioral sciences is still in-
cipient and sharply skewed towards psychological paradigms that have not 
been developed using experimental methods. at the beginning of the twen-
ty first century, historians may explore collaboration with the new behavior 
sciences that offer empirically tested theories that have proven very useful 
in predicting and controlling both animal and human behavior. Radical beha-
viorism was developed as a scientific endeavor that precludes unsound ge-
neralization of behavior theory and principles; however these same theories 
and principles may be used as guidelines to direct historical research (never 
to make unsubstantiated assertions, but rather to narrow the selection and 
search for bibliographical and historical materials).
in order to develop a Behavior analytical based research agenda the his-
torian must first try to determine if the particular set of historical events that 
he tries to account for fit the mold of what Behavior Analysis can offer. Be-
havior analysis was originally developed to study how reinforcement contin-
gencies change the behavior of individual organisms; thus, historical events 
determined by a single subject, where enough information exists to deter-
mine the outcomes of the subject’s behavior would be ideally suited for the 
aforementioned research agenda. once the historian has determined that a 
behavior analytic perspective is in order, an attempt should be made to clearly 
define the particular behavior that the research agenda attempts to account 
for. lastly, an attempt should be made to identify the outcomes of the target 
behavior. Obviously once the outcomes have been identified and adequately 
documented an interpretation problem arises related with their putative rein-
forcing or punishing effects on the subject. perhaps, as was the case with the 
example provided in this text, interpretation problems may be circumvented in 
terms of the relative frequency of the target behavior in the subject’s reported 
behavioral repertoire.
as the present author knows of no previous attempts to orient historical 
analysis in the way suggested in this paper it would be of great interest to 
receive information that may confirm (or disconfirm) the usefulness of the 
present approach 
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